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Abstract
One of the main results shown through Roughgarden’s notions of smooth games and robust
price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of
anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with that of pure Nash equilibria in the class
of weighted congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions and that
such a value can always be derived through the, so called, smoothness argument. We significantly
extend this result by proving that, for a variety of (even non-sum-bounded) utilitarian and
egalitarian social functions and for a broad generalization of the class of weighted congestion
games with non-negative (and possibly decreasing) latency functions, the worst-case price of
anarchy of ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria still coincides with that of ǫ-approximate
pure Nash equilibria, for any ǫ ≥ 0. As a byproduct of our proof, it also follows that such a
value can always be determined by making use of the primal-dual method we introduced in a
previous work. It is important to note that our scenario of investigation is beyond the scope
of application of the robust price of anarchy (for as it is currently defined), so that our result
seems unlikely to be alternatively proved via the smoothness framework.
1 Introduction
The celebrated notion of robust price of anarchy introduced by Roughgarden in [19, 20] has lately
arouse much interest in the determination of inefficiency bounds for pure Nash equilibria which
may automatically extend to some of their appealing generalizations, such as mixed Nash equi-
libria, correlated equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria. These three types of solutions have a
particular flavor since, differently from pure Nash equilibria, they are always guaranteed to exist
by Nash’s Theorem [16]1; moreover, the last two ones can also be efficiently computed and even
easily learned when a game is repeatedly played over time.
∗This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2010–2011 research project ARS TechnoMedia: “Algorithmics
for Social Technological Networks” funded by the Italian Ministry of University.
†Department of Mathematics and Physics “Ennio De Giorgi”, University of Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano,
P.O. Box 193, 73100 Lecce - Italy, Email: vittorio.bilo@unisalento.it.
1To this aim, we recall that the set of coarse correlated equilibria contains that of correlated equilibria, which
contains that of mixed Nash equilibria, which contains that of pure Nash equilibria.
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To this aim, Roughgarden [19, 20] identifies a class of games, called smooth games, for which a
simple three-line proof, called smoothness argument, shows significant upper bounds on the price of
anarchy of pure Nash equilibria as long as the social function measuring the quality of any strategy
profile in the game is sum-bounded, that is, upper bounded by the sum of the players’ costs2. He
then defines the robust price of anarchy of a smooth game as the best-possible (i.e., the lowest)
upper bound which can be derived by making use of this argument and provides an extension
theorem which shows that, still for sum-bounded social functions, the price of anarchy of coarse
correlated equilibria of any smooth game is upper bounded by its robust price of anarchy. Finally,
he shows that several games considered in the literature happen to be smooth and that the class
of (unweighted) congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions is
tight for the utilitarian social function (that is, the social function defined as the sum of the
players’ costs), in the sense that, in this class of games, the worst-case price of anarchy of pure
Nash equilibria exactly matches the robust price of anarchy. This last result has been subsequently
extended to the class of weighted congestion games by Bhawalkar, Gairing and Roughgarden in [3].
1.1 Our Contribution and Significance
In this work, we generalize the tightness result by Bhawalkar, Gairing and Roughgarden along the
following four directions (see Section 2 for formal definitions):
1. the class of games we consider is a broad generalization of that of weighted congestion games.
In particular, we focus on generalized weighted congestion games, that is, games in which each
player’s perceived cost is defined as a certain linear combination of all the players’ individual
costs originally experienced in some underlying weighted congestion game. Thus, it is quite
easy to figure out that the class of generalized weighted congestion games widely extends that
of weighted congestion games;
2. the families of social functions we consider are generalizations of both the utilitarian and the
egalitarian social functions (where the egalitarian social function is defined as the maximum
of the players’ costs). In particular, a family of utilitarian social functions is obtained by
summing up a certain contribution from each player, whereas a family of egalitarian social
functions is obtained by taking the maximum contribution among the players, where each
player’s contribution is given by a conic combination of the players’ individual costs. We
stress that such a combination may significantly differ from the one used to define the players’
perceived costs, so that there exist social functions in both families that may not be sum-
bounded;
3. the latency functions we consider in the definition of the players’ individual costs are selected
from a family of allowable non-negative functions with no additional restrictions. This permits
us to encompass also latency functions not considered so far in the previous tightness results
known in the literature, such as, for instance, the widely used fair cost sharing rule induced
by the Shapley value [21];
4. the solution concepts we consider are the approximate versions of all the four types of equi-
libria named so far. In particular, for any real value ǫ ≥ 0, we focus on either ǫ-approximate
2Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that all games under consideration are cost minimization ones. All
the claimed properties and results can be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of payoff maximization games.
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pure Nash equilibria and ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria. For the special case of
ǫ = 0, one reobtains the notions of pure Nash equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria, so
that results for these solution concepts can be obtained as a special case of the ones holding
for their approximate versions.
More precisely, but still informally speaking, we prove the following result (Theorem 1 in Section 3):
for a variety of utilitarian and egalitarian social functions and for any real value ǫ ≥ 0,
the worst-case price of anarchy of ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibria coincides with that
of ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria in the class generalized weighted congestion
games with non-negative latency functions.
As it can be appreciated, the above tightness result generalizes the previous one by Bhawalkar,
Gairing and Roughgarden along all four directions simultaneously. The technique we use to prove
the theorem is the primal-dual method that we introduced in [4]. In fact, as a byproduct of our
proof, it also follows that, in the above considered scenario of investigation,
the worst-case price of anarchy of ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibria can always be
determined through the primal-dual method.
We would like to stress that, when adopting the social functions described at point 2, generalized
weighted congestion games are not smooth games in general, so that the above tightness result
seems unlikely to be reproved via smoothness arguments, at least in the way in which they have
been defined and used so far in the literature. This seems to provide an evidence that the primal-
dual method may be more powerful than the smoothness framework as far as we focus on congestion
games and some of their possible generalizations.
1.2 Related Work
The notion of price of anarchy as a measure of the inefficiency caused by selfish behavior in non-
cooperative games has been introduced in a seminal paper by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14]
in 1999. Since then, several classes of games have been studied under this perspective. Among
these classes, congestion games introduced by Rosenthal in [18] and their weighted variants [15]
occupy a preeminent role.
Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10] focus on the worst-
case price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in either weighted and unweighted congestion games
under the utilitarian social function. They independently give tight bounds for the case of affine
latency functions and almost tight upper and lower bounds for the case of polynomial latency
functions with non-negative coefficients. Such a gap has been subsequently closed by Aland et
al. in [1]. Moreover, Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Spirakis [12] obtain tight bounds on the
worst-case price of anarchy of approximate pure Nash equilibria in unweighted congestion games
for the case of polynomial latency functions with non-negative coefficients, while Christodoulou
and Koutsoupias [11] show that the worst-case price of anarchy of correlated equilibria is the same
as that for pure Nash equilibria in weighted and unweighted congestion games when considering
affine latency functions. As already said, such an equivalence has been further extended to coarse
correlated equilibria and to any class of non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions by
Roughgarden [19, 20] in the unweighted case and by Bhawalkar, Gairing and Roughgarden [3] in
the weighted case, by making use of the smoothness argument and the robust price of anarchy.
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Robust bounds on the worst-case price of anarchy have been lately achieved via extensions of
the smoothness argument in some generalizations of (unweighted) congestion games. In particular,
de Keijzer et al. [13] and Rahn and Scha¨fer [17] consider the altruistic extension of congestion
games in which, similarly to our model of generalized congestion games, the perceived cost of each
player is defined as a linear combination of the individual costs of all the players in the game.
Anyway, while we do not impose any kind of restriction on such a combination, they consider
the case in which the multiplicative coefficients lie in the interval [0, 1] and, for each player i, the
contribution of the individual cost of player i to her perceived cost has to be always multiplied by
1. Moreover, they restrict their analysis to the case in which the social function is the sum of the
players’ individual costs.
Much less attention has been devoted in the literature to the egalitarian social function, for
which Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10] give an asymptotically tight bound on the worst-case
price of anarchy in unweighted congestion games with affine latency functions.
We introduced the primal-dual method in [4] as a tool for obtaining tight bounds on the ineffi-
ciencies caused by selfish behavior in weighted congestion games and their possible generalizations
for a variety of solutions concepts. In particular the primal-dual method has been applied by Bilo`,
Flammini and Gallotti [7] to derive tight bounds on the worst-case price of anarchy of pure Nash
equilibria in congestion games with affine latency functions under the assumption that the players’
knowledge is restricted by the presence of an underlying social knowledge graph; by Bilo` [5] to
derive tight bounds on the worst-case price of stability of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games
with affine latency functions and altruistic players; by Bilo` and Paladini [9] to derive tight bounds
on the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a one-round walk of ǫ-approximate best-
responses starting from any initial strategy profile in cut games, for any ǫ ≥ 0; by Bilo` et al. [8] to
derive a surprising matching lower bound on the price of anarchy of subgame perfect equilibria in
sequential cut games; and by Bilo`, Fanelli and Moscardelli [6] to derive significant upper bounds
on the price of anarchy of lookahead equilibria in congestion games with affine latency functions.
1.3 Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give all necessary definitions and notation
and provide also some preliminary remarks. Section 3 contains the technical contribution of the
paper, with the proof of our main theorem. In the last section, we conclude and discuss open
problems.
2 Definitions, Notation and Preliminaries
A weighted congestion game is a tuple CG =
(
[n], (wi)i∈[n], E, (Σi)i∈[n], (ℓe)e∈E
)
such that [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of n ≥ 2 players, wi > 0 is the weight of player i, E is a non-empty set of
resources, Σi ⊆ 2
E \ {∅} is a non-empty set of strategies for player i and ℓe : R≥0 → R≥0 is the
latency function of resource e ∈ E. Denote as Σ =
∏
i∈[n]Σi the set of all strategy profiles of CG,
that is, the set of outcomes which can be realized when each player i ∈ [n] chooses a strategy
in Σi. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is then a vector of strategies, where, for each i ∈ [n],
σi ∈ Σi denotes the choice of player i in σ. For a strategy profile σ and a resource e ∈ E,
the value ne(σ) =
∑
i∈[n]:e∈σi
wi denotes the congestion of resource e in σ, that is, the sum of
the weights of all the players choosing e in σ. The individual cost of player i in σ is defined as
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ci(σ) = wi
∑
e∈σi
ℓe(ne(σ)).
Given a finite space of functions F ⊆ {f : R≥0 → R≥0}, let B(F) = {fk : R≥0 → R≥0 | k ∈ [r]}
be a basis for F of cardinality r, whose elements (functions) are numbered from 1 to r. We say
that CG is defined over F if, for each e ∈ E, it holds that ℓe =
∑
k∈[r] v
e
kfk, where v
e
k ∈ R is a
scalar. Throughout the paper, we will impose only minimal assumptions on F ; in particular,
we will assume that any f ∈ F is non-negative with f(x) = 0 if and only if x = 0.
For any n-dimensional vector of (positive) weights w = (w1, . . . , wn), we denote with Cw(F)
the class of all the weighted congestion games with players’ weights induced by w and defined over
F . Moreover, for a fixed quadruple Tw = ([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), called a congestion model, the set
CTw(F) = {CG ∈ Cw(F) | CG = (Tw, (ℓe)e∈E)} is the set of all the weighted congestion games
induced by Tw and defined over F . Note that, since for each game CG ∈ CTw(F) and e ∈ E there
exist r numbers ve1, . . . , v
e
r such that ℓe =
∑
k∈[r] v
e
kfk, it follows that CG can be specified by the
pair (Tw, (v
e
k)e∈E,k∈[r]). Moreover, it holds that Cw(F) =
⋃
Tw
CTw(F). Finally, we denote with
Σ(Tw) the set of strategy profiles induced by the congestion model Tw.
A generalized weighted congestion game is a pair (CG, α) where CG =
([n], (wi)i∈[n], E, (Σi)i∈[n], (ℓe)e∈E) is a weighted congestion game and α ∈ R
n×n is an n-
dimensional square matrix. Game (CG, α) has the same set of players and strategies of CG, but
the perceived cost of player i in the strategy profile σ is defined as
ĉi(σ) =
∑
j∈[n]
αijcj(σ) =
∑
j∈[n]
αijwj
∑
e∈E:e∈σj
ℓe(ne(σ)) =
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj,
where ci(σ) is the individual cost that player i experiences in σ in the underlying weighted con-
gestion game CG. Note that, when α is the identity matrix, (CG, α) coincides with CG, while, in
all the other cases, (CG, α) may not be isomorphic to any weighted congestion game, so that the
set of generalized weighted congestion games expands that of weighted congestion games.
Given a strategy profile σ, a player i ∈ [n] and a strategy x ∈ Σi, we denote with (σ−i, x)
the strategy profile obtained from σ when player i changes her strategy from σi to x, while the
strategies of all the other players are kept fixed. In particular, for any ǫ ≥ 0, the perceived cost
suffered by player i in σ minus 1 + ǫ times the perceived cost suffered by player i in (σ−i, x) in a
generalized weighted congestion game can be expressed as follows:
ĉi(σ)− (1 + ǫ) · ĉi(σ−i, x) =
∑
j∈[n]
αijcj(σ)− (1 + ǫ)
∑
j∈[n]
αijcj(σ−i, x)
= αiiwi
(∑
e∈σi
ℓe(ne(σ)) − (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈x
ℓe(ne(σ−i, x))
)
+
∑
j∈[n]:j 6=i
αijwj
(∑
e∈σi
ℓe(ne(σ)) − (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈x
ℓe(ne(σ−i, x))
)
= αiiwi
 ∑
e∈σi\x
ℓe(ne(σ)) − (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈x\σi
ℓe(ne(σ) + wi)

+
∑
j∈[n]:j 6=i
αijwj
 ∑
e∈σi\x
ℓe(ne(σ)) − (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈x\σi
ℓe(ne(σ) + wi)
 .
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Hence, we get
ĉi(σ)− (1 + ǫ) · ĉi(σ−i, x) =∑
e∈σi\x
ℓe(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj − (1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈x\σi
ℓe(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
 . (1)
Next two definitions formalize the two concepts of approximate equilibria that we will consider
throughout the paper.
Definition 1 For any ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium is a probability
distribution p defined over Σ such that, for any player i ∈ [n] and strategy x ∈ Σi, it holds that∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · ĉi(σ) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · ĉi(σ−i, x),
where, for each σ ∈ Σ, pσ is the probability assigned to σ by p.
Definition 2 For any ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ
such that, for any player i ∈ [n] and strategy x ∈ Σi, it holds that ĉi(σ) ≤ (1 + ǫ) · ĉi(σ−i, x).
Denote as PNEǫ(CG, α) and CCEǫ(CG, α), respectively, the set of ǫ-approximate pure Nash
equilibria and ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria of the generalized weighted congestion
game (CG, α). It is easy to see that, for any ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium σ is an
ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium p such that pσ = 1 and pτ = 0 for any τ ∈ Σ \ {σ}.
So, PNEǫ(CG, α) ⊆ CCEǫ(CG, α). Moreover, the sets PNE0(CG, α) and CCE0(CG, α) coincide with
the sets of pure Nash equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria of (CG, α), respectively.
For an n-dimensional non-null square matrix β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and a player i ∈ [n], let β-costi : Σ →
R>0 be the contribution of player i to the definition of the social function which is defined as follows:
β-costi(σ) =
∑
j∈[n]
βijcj(σ) =
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj .
Let ∆(Σ) be the set of all the probability distributions defined over Σ. For a p ∈ ∆(Σ), the
β-utilitarian social function is a function β-SUM : ∆(Σ)→ R>0 such that
β-SUM(p) =
∑
i∈[n]
Eσ∼p [β-costi(σ)]
= Eσ∼p
∑
i∈[n]
β-costi(σ)

=
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj

and the β-egalitarian social function is a function β-MAX : ∆(Σ)→ R>0 such that
β-MAX(p) = max
i∈[n]
{Eσ∼p [β-costi(σ)]}
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= max
i∈[n]
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj
 .3
Consider the case in which p ∈ ∆(Σ) is indeed a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ. When β is the
identity matrix, β-SUM (resp. β-MAX) coincides with the sum (resp. the maximum) of the players’
individual costs in the underlying weighted congestion game CG, while, when β = α, β-SUM (resp.
β-MAX) coincides with the sum (resp. the maximum) of the players’ perceived costs in (CG, α). In
general, an infinite variety of social functions can be defined by tuning the choice of matrix β4. For
a function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, we denote with o the social optimum, that is, any strategy profile
minimizing β-SF. Note that, by the properties of the latency functions and the definition of β5, it
follows that β-SF(o) > 0. The ǫ-approximate coarse correlated price of anarchy of (CG, α) under
the social function β-SF is defined as
CCPoAǫ(β-SF,CG, α) = max
p∈CCEǫ(CG,α)
β-SF(p)
β-SF(o)
,
while the ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy of (CG, α) under the social function β-SF is defined
as
PPoAǫ(β-SF,CG, α) = max
σ∈PNEǫ(CG,α)
β-SF(σ)
β-SF(o)
.
For an n-dimensional vector of weights w = (w1, . . . , wn) and a matrix α ∈ R
n×n, we denote
with Cw(F , α) = {(CG, α) : CG ∈ Cw(F)} the set of all the generalized weighted congestion games
induced by w and α and defined over F . Similarly, for any congestion model Tw, one defines the
class CTw(F , α), so as to obtain Cw(F , α) =
⋃
Tw
CTw(F , α). The worst-case ǫ-approximate coarse
correlated price of anarchy of the class Cw(F , α) under the social function β-SF is defined as
CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = sup
(CG,α)∈Cw(F ,α)
CCPoAǫ(β-SF,CG, α).
Similarly, one defines the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy of the class Cw(F , α)
under the social function β-SF.
By PNEǫ(CG, α) ⊆ CCEǫ(CG, α), it follows that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≤
CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) for any real value ǫ ≥ 0, n-dimensional vector of weights w, finite
space of function F , pair of matrices α ∈ Rn×n and β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}.
Throughout the paper, we will also refer to the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy and
to the worst-case ǫ-approximate coarse correlated price of anarchy of subsets of Cw(F , α) which
are naturally defined by restriction.
We conclude this section with an easy, although crucial result, stating that, independently of
which is the adopted social function, both the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy and
the worst-case ǫ-approximate coarse correlated price of anarchy of a class of generalized weighted
congestion games remain the same even if one restricts to only those games in the given class whose
social optimum has social value equal to one6. To this aim, for any function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}
4One could even relax the constraint β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and allow for negative entries in matrix β as long as
∑
i∈[n] βij ≥ 0
for each j ∈ [n] and
∑
i∈[n] βij > 0 for some j ∈ [n] which still guarantees either β-SUM(σ) > 0 and β-MAX(σ) > 0
for each σ ∈ Σ.
5From now on, we will always assume that β is a non-null matrix.
6Indeed, such a result implicitly holds for the worst-case ǫ-approximate price of anarchy of any kind of equilibrium.
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and matrix β ∈ Rn×n≥0 , let Cw(F , α) ⊂ Cw(F , α) be the subset of all the generalized weighted
congestion games induced by w and α and defined over F such that the social optimum o satisfies
β-SF(o) = 1. Similarly, for any congestion model Tw, one defines the class CTw(F , α), so as to
obtain Cw(F , α) =
⋃
Tw
CTw(F , α).
Lemma 1 For any real value ǫ ≥ 0, n-dimensional vector of weights w, finite space of func-
tions F , pair of matrices α ∈ Rn×n and β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX},
it holds that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) and CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) =
CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)).
Proof: Fix a congestion model Tw, a pair of matrices α ∈ R
n×n and β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and a
function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}. The claim directly follows from the fact that, for any game
G :=
(
Tw, (v
e
k)e∈E,k∈[r], α
)
∈ CTw(F , α) such that β-SF(o) := x > 0, there always exists a
game G :=
(
Tw, (v
e
k)e∈E,k∈[r], α
)
∈ CTw(F , α), obtained by setting v
e
k = v
e
k/x, such that, for
any σ ∈ Σ(Tw), it holds that∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj = x
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj
and that
max
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
βijwj
∑
e∈σj
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ)) = x ·max
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
βijwj
∑
e∈σj
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ)).
Moreover, for any σ ∈ Σ(Tw) and i ∈ [n], it holds that∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj = x
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj .
That is, for any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ(Tw), the social value of σ in game G is equal to x times
the social value of σ in game G, independently of which is the adopted social function. Moreover,
for any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ(Tw) and any i ∈ [n], the perceived cost of player i in σ in game
G is equal to x times the perceived cost of player i in σ in game G. This implies that G and G
have the same set of equilibria (whatever the concept of equilibrium is defined) and that the ratio
between any linear combination of the social values of any set of strategy profiles is the same in
both games. 
3 The Main Result
Our main result is the proof of the following general theorem.
Theorem 1 For any real value ǫ ≥ 0, n-dimensional vector of weights w, finite space of functions
F , pair of matrices α ∈ Rn×n and β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, it holds that
PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)). Moreover, the value PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α))
can always be determined via the primal-dual method.
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Proof: Fix a real value ǫ ≥ 0, an n-dimensional vector of weights w, a finite space of functions
F , a pair of matrices α ∈ Rn×n and β ∈ Rn×n≥0 and a function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}. We prove the
claim in four steps.
Step 1) Definition of the representative congestion model T∗
w
.
Let T∗
w
= ([n],w, E∗, (Σ∗i )i∈[n]) be a congestion model such that
1. Σ∗i = {σ
∗
i , o
∗
i } for each i ∈ [n], i.e., each player i ∈ [n] has exactly two strategies denoted as
σ∗i and o
∗
i ;
2. the set of resources E∗ and the strategies σ∗i and o
∗
i for each i ∈ [n] are properly defined
in such a way that, for each P,Q ⊆ [n], there exists exactly one resource e(P,Q) ∈ E∗ for
which it holds that {i ∈ [n] | e(P,Q) ∈ σ∗i } = P and {i ∈ [n] | e(P,Q) ∈ o
∗
i } = Q. Hence,
|E∗| = 2n · 2n = 4n.
Intuitively, the representative congestion model T∗
w
is defined in such a way that the pair of strategy
profiles σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) and o
∗ = (o∗1, . . . , o
∗
n) is able to encompass all possible configurations of
congestions that may arise in any pair of strategy profiles and for any congestion model induced
by w. In particular, the following fundamental property holds.
Property 1 For any congestion model Tw = ([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), resource e ∈ E and pair of
profiles σ′,σ′′ ∈ Σ(Tw), there always exists a resource e ∈ E
∗ such that {i ∈ [n] | e ∈ σ′i} = {i ∈
[n] | e ∈ σ∗i } and {i ∈ [n] | e ∈ σ
′′
i } = {i ∈ [n] | e ∈ o
∗
i }.
Proof: Fix a congestion model Tw = ([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), a resource e ∈ E and pair of profiles
σ
′,σ′′ ∈ Σ(Tw). Let {i ∈ [n] | e ∈ σ
′
i} := P and {i ∈ [n] | e ∈ σ
′′
i } := Q. To prove the claim, it
suffices choosing e = e(P,Q). 
Step 2) Definition of a primal-dual formulation for PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)).
Fix a function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}. Our aim is to use the optimal solution of a linear program
PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) to achieve an upper bound on the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of
anarchy of any game in CT∗
w
(F , α) under the restriction that the latency functions are suitably
tuned so as to make σ∗ the worst ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium and o∗ a social optimum
(of social value 1). The linear program PPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) for the β-utilitarian social function
is defined as follows.
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maximize
∑
e∈E∗
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
βijwj
subject to∑
e∈σ∗
i
\o∗
i
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈o∗
i
\σ∗
i
∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
∑
e∈E∗
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(o
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈o∗
j
βijwj ≤ 1,
vek ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
∗, k ∈ [r]
The first n constraints guarantee that no player can lower her perceived cost of a factor more than
1 + ǫ by switching to the strategy she uses in the social optimum o∗ (see Equation (1)), while the
last constraint normalizes to at most 1 the value β-SUM(o∗).
The dual program DPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is the following (we associate a variable yi with the
ith constraint of the first n ones and a variable γ with the normalizing constraint).
minimize γ
subject to∑
i∈[n]:e∈σ∗
i
\o∗
i
yifk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
i∈[n]:e∈o∗
i
\σ∗
i
yifk(ne(σ
∗) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj

+γfk(ne(o
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈o∗
j
βijwj ≥ fk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
βijwj, ∀e ∈ E
∗, k ∈ [r]
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
γ ≥ 0
Similarly, the linear program PPPNE(MAX,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) for the β-egalitarian social function is
defined as follows.
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maximize t
subject to∑
e∈σ∗
i
\o∗
i
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
e∈o∗
i
\σ∗
i
∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
∑
e∈E∗
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
β1jwj = t,
∑
e∈E∗
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
βijwj ≤ t, ∀i ∈ [n] \ {1}
∑
e∈E∗
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(o
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈o∗
j
βijwj ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n]
vek ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
∗, k ∈ [r]
t ≥ 0
Here, again the first n constraints guarantee that no player can lower her perceived cost of a factor
more than 1 + ǫ by switching to the strategy she uses in the social optimum o∗. The next n
constraints impose that the maximum value in the social function β-MAX(σ∗) is attained by player
1 (this hypothesis is without loss of generality up to a renumbering of the players) and has value
t (which is the objective function to be maximized), while the last n constraints normalizes to at
most 1 the value β-MAX(o∗).
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The dual program DPPNE(MAX,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is the following (we associate variables yi, zi and γi
with the ith constraint of the first, the middle and the last family of n constraints, respectively).
minimize
∑
i∈[n]
γi
subject to∑
i∈[n]:e∈σ∗
i
\o∗
i
yifk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
i∈[n]:e∈o∗
i
\σ∗
i
yifk(ne(σ
∗) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
αijwj

+fk(ne(σ
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
zi
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σ∗
j
βijwj
+fk(ne(o
∗))
∑
i∈[n]
γi
∑
j∈[n]:e∈o∗
j
βijwj ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
∗, k ∈ [r]
∑
i∈N
zi ≤ −1
yi, zi, γi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
We stress that, being all the values ǫ, (wi)i∈[n], (αij , βij)i,j∈[n], ne(σ
∗) and ne(o
∗) fixed con-
stants in the proposed formulations, PPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is a linear program defined over the
variables (vek)e∈E∗,k∈[r] and PPPNE(MAX,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is a linear program defined over the variables
(vek)e∈E∗,k∈[r] and t, as needed. Note that, for SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is, in gen-
eral, under-constrained. In fact, in order to assure that σ∗ and o∗ are the worst ǫ-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, respectively, one should guarantee β-SF(σ∗) ≥ β-SF(σ)
for each other ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗, if any, and β-SF(o∗) ≤ β-SF(σ)
for each σ ∈ Σ∗. Moreover, the normalizing constraints have also been relaxed so as to assure
β-SF(o∗) ≤ 1 rather than β-SF(o∗) = 1. Anyway, as we will discuss in the proof of Lemma 2, either
removing or relaxing these constraints can only worsen the resulting upper bounds.
The significance of the previously defined pairs of primal-dual formulations is witnessed by
the following lemma which states that the value of an optimal solution to PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗)
provides an upper bound on PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)).
Lemma 2 For a fixed SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, let x be the value of an optimal solution to
PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) when this linear problem is not unlimited, otherwise let x = ∞. Then
PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≤ x.
Proof: We first show that PPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) and PPPNE(MAX,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) are both feasible.
In fact, fixed an index k∗ ∈ [r], the following solution
vek =

(
nfk(wj)wj
∑
i∈[n] βij
)−1
if k = k∗ and e ∈ {e({j}, ∅), e(∅, {j})} for some j ∈ [n],
0 otherwise
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is feasible for PPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) and yields an objective value equal to 1. Similarly, assuming,
for instance, that the players are numbered in such a way that
∑
i∈[n] β1i ≥
∑
i∈[n] βji for each
j ∈ [n] \ {1}, the solution with t = 1 and
vek =

(
fk(wj)wj
∑
i∈[n] β1i
)−1
if k = k∗ and e ∈ {e({j}, ∅), e(∅, {j})} for some j ∈ [n],
0 otherwise
is feasible for PPPNE(MAX,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) and yields an objective value equal to 1. Hence, for any
SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, exactly one of the two cases included in the claim may occur.
If PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is unlimited, then x =∞ and the claim is trivially true.
So, we can assume that PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) admits an optimal solution of value x. As
we have already observed, PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) may be under-constrained. Nevertheless, recall
that we are only interested in an upper bound on the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of
anarchy of the class CT∗
w
(F , α) attainable when the latency functions are suitably tuned so as
to make σ∗ the worst ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium and o∗ a social optimum (of social
value 1). Let us denote with ĈT∗
w
(F , α) such a subclass of CT∗
w
(F , α). Hence, since once fixed
the profiles σ∗ and o∗ any game in ĈT∗
w
(F , α) can be specified by a particular choice of the val-
ues vek, and because the removal or the relaxation of some constraints in a maximization prob-
lem can only increase the value of the optimal solution, we obtain that the optimal solution to
PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) yields an upper bound on the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of an-
archy of the class ĈT∗
w
(F , α). That is, PPoAǫ(β-SF, ĈT∗
w
(F , α)) ≤ x. Moreover, since the optimal
solution to PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) has value x, then, by the Strong Duality Theorem, each optimal
solution (y∗, γ∗) to DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) satisfies x = γ∗. By Property 1, the particular combi-
natorial structure of the pair σ∗ and o∗ implies that, for any alternative pair of strategy profiles
σ and o in T∗
w
, the set of constraints of the dual program DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o) is a subset of that
of DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗). This implies that any optimal solution (y, γ) to DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o)
must obey γ ≤ γ∗. Thus, one can claim that γ∗ = x is indeed an upper bound on the worst-case
ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy of the class CT∗
w
(F , α), that is, PPoAǫ(β-SF, CT∗
w
(F , α)) ≤ x.
Note also that, again by Property 1, for any other congestion model Tw = ([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), the
pair of primal-dual formulations PPPNE(SF,Tw,σ,o) and DPPNE(SF,Tw,σ,o) induced by any pair
of strategy profiles σ,o ∈ Σ(Tw) are such that the set of constraints of DPPNE(SF,Tw,σ,o) is again
a subset of that of DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) and this implies that γ∗ = x is even an upper bound on
the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy of the whole class Cw(F , α) =
⋃
Tw
CTw(F , α),
that is, PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≤ x. 
Step 3) Proof of existence of a game (CG, α) ∈ Cw(F , α) such that PPoAǫ(β-SF,CG, α) = x.
Lemma 3 For a fixed SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, let x be the value of an optimal solution to
PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) when this linear problem is not unlimited, otherwise let x = ∞. Then
PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = x.
Proof: Assume that PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) admits a feasible solution ŜOLSUM = (v̂
e
k)e∈E∗,k∈[r] or
ŜOLMAX =
(
(v̂ek)e∈E∗,k∈[r], t̂
)
, both of value x̂, depending on which is the value of SF. Consider the
game (CG, α), where CG = (T∗
w
, (v̂ek)e∈E∗,k∈[r]) is defined by the representative congestion model
T∗
w
coupled with the values (v̂ek)e∈E∗,k∈[r]. Since, for any SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, ŜOLSF is feasible for
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PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗), it follows that σ∗ is an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for (CG, α) such
that β-SF(σ∗) = x̂. This implies PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≥ x̂ (recall, in fact, that β-SF(o
∗) ≤ 1).
In the case in which PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) admits an optimal solution SOLSF of value x, by
the above argument, it follows that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≥ x, which, together with Lemma 2,
implies the claim. In the case in which PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is unlimited, then, for any x ∈ R,
there exists a feasible solution SOLSF to PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) of value at least x, which implies
that, for any x ∈ R, it holds that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≥ x. 
Step 4) Definition of a primal-dual formulation for CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) and proof of the
“Extension Lemma”.
Fix a congestion model Tw = ([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Σ(Tw))
and a strategy profile o ∈ Σ(Tw). We define the following primal program PPCCE(SUM,Tw,p,o)
for the β-utilitarian social function.
maximize
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj
subject to∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈σi\oi
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈oi\σi
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(o))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj ≤ 1,
vek ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E, k ∈ [r]
The dual program DPCCE(SUM,Tw,p,o) is the following (again, we associate a variable yi with
the ith constraint of the first n ones and a variable γ with the normalizing constraint).
minimize γ
subject to∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈σi\oi
yifk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈oi\σi
yifk(ne(σ) +wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj

+γfk(ne(o))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj ≥
∑
σ∈Σ
pσfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj , ∀e ∈ E, k ∈ [r]
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
γ ≥ 0
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Similarly, for the β-egalitarian social function, the primal program PPCCE(MAX,Tw,p,o) is
defined as follows.
maximize t
subject to∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈σi\oi
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈oi\σi
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
 ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
β1jwj = t,∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj ≤ t, ∀i ∈ [n] \ {1}
∑
e∈E
∑
k∈[r]
vekfk(ne(o))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n]
vek ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E, k ∈ [r]
t ≥ 0
The dual program DPCCE(MAX,Tw,p,o) is the following (again, we associate variables yi, zi and
γi with the ith constraint of the first, the middle and the last family of n constraints, respectively).
minimize
∑
i∈[n]
γi
subject to∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈σi\oi
yifk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
−(1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈oi\σi
yifk(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj

+
∑
σ∈Σ
pσfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
zi
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj
+fk(ne(o))
∑
i∈[n]
γi
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E, k ∈ [r]∑
i∈N
zi ≤ −1
yi, zi, γi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
Again, even though both PPCCE(SUM,Tw,p,o) and PPCCE(MAX,Tw,p,o) may be, in general,
under-constrained, by the same arguments used in the discussion of the pairs of primal-dual for-
mulations used for bounding the worst-case ǫ-approximate pure price of anarchy, it follows that,
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for each function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, the optimal solution to PPCCE(SF,Tw,p,o) yields an upper
bound on the worst-case ǫ-approximate coarse correlated price of anarchy of the class CTw(F , α)
attainable when p is taken for the worst ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium and o for the
social optimum (of social value 1). Let us denote such a class with ĈTw(F , α).
The following lemma shows that any upper bound on PPoAǫ(β-SF, CT∗
w
(F , α)) proved via the
primal-dual method automatically extends to CCPoAǫ(β-SF, ĈTw(F , α)).
Lemma 4 (Extension Lemma) For any function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, congestion model Tw =
([n],w, E, (Σi)i∈[n]), probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Σ(Tw)) and strategy profile o ∈ Σ(Tw), it holds
that any feasible solution to DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o) is also a feasible solution to DPCCE(SF,Tw,p,o).
Proof: Let (y∗, γ∗) be a feasible solution to DPPNE(SUM,T
∗
w
,σ,o). By Property 1 of the rep-
resentative congestion model T∗
w
, it follows that, for any pair of strategy profiles σ,o ∈ Σ(Tw), it
holds that∑
i∈[n]:e∈σi\oi
y∗i fk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
− (1 + ǫ)
∑
i∈[n]:e∈oi\σi
y∗i fk(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj

+ γ∗fk(ne(o))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj ≥ fk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj (2)
for any e ∈ E and k ∈ [r].
Since pσ ≥ 0 for each σ ∈ Σ(Tw), by multiplying inequality (2) for pσ and then summing up
the obtained inequalities for each σ ∈ Σ(Tw), we obtain that, for each e ∈ E and k ∈ [r], it holds
that∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈σi\oi
y∗i fk(ne(σ))
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj
− (1 + ǫ)
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]:e∈oi\σi
y∗i fk(ne(σ) + wi)
αiiwi + ∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
αijwj

+ γ∗fk(ne(o))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈oj
βijwj
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ ≥
∑
σ∈Σ
pσfk(ne(σ))
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]:e∈σj
βijwj . (3)
By
∑
σ∈Σ pσ = 1, it follows that, for any e ∈ E and k ∈ [r], inequality (3) coincides with the
relative dual constraint of DPCCE(SUM,Tw,p,o) and this shows that the solution (y
∗, γ∗) is also
feasible for DPCCE(SUM,Tw,p,o).
A similar argument shows the claim for the case of the social function β-MAX. 
We now have all the ingredients needed to conclude the proof of the theorem.
Fix a function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}. Assume, first, that PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) is un-
limited. Then, by Lemma 3, it holds that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = ∞ which, to-
gether with PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≤ CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)), immediately implies that
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PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)). By applying Lemma 1, we obtain
PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)).
In the case in which PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ∗,o∗) admits an optimal solution of value x, by Lemma 3,
it holds that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = x. Moreover, by the Strong Duality Theorem, there exists
a feasible solution (y∗, γ∗) to DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o) of value γ∗ = x. Choose an arbitrary game
(CG, α) ∈ Cw(F , α) such that CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = CCPoAǫ(β-SF,CG, α) and let Tw be the
congestion model defining CG, p be the worst ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium of (CG, α)
and o be the social optimum (of social value 1). By the definition of Tw, p and o, it follows that
the optimal solution to PPCCE(SF,Tw,p,o) has a value of at least CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)), which,
by the Weak Duality Theorem, implies in turn that any feasible solution to DPCCE(SF,Tw,p,o)
has a value of at least CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)). By Lemma 4, it follows that (y
∗, γ∗) is also a
feasible solution to DPCCE(SF,Tw,p,o). This implies that CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) ≤ γ
∗ = x =
PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)). Again, by applying Lemma 1, we obtain that PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) =
CCPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)).
It is clear from our discussion that the value PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α)) = PPoAǫ(β-SF, Cw(F , α))
can always be (theoretically) determined via the primal-dual method, that is, by computing the
value of the optimal solution of either the primal program PPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o) or the dual one
DPPNE(SF,T
∗
w
,σ,o) for each function SF ∈ {SUM,MAX}, and this concludes the proof (solving
the dual program, in particular, requires to determine the minimum value γ∗ for which all the
r · 4n possible constraints induced by the |E∗| = 4n pairs of values yielded by the representative
congestion model T∗
w
on each of the r components of the latency functions are satisfied). 
4 Conclusions and Open Problems
By introducing the notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy, Roughgarden [19, 20]
showed that the class of congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions
is tight under the utilitarian social function (see Section 5 of the Appendix for formal definitions).
This result has been extended to the class of weighted congestion games by Bhawalkar, Gairing and
Roughgarden [3]. By exploiting the primal-dual method we introduced in [4], we have generalized
this result along four directions. In fact, our tightness result holds for the class of generalized
weighted congestion games, for generalizations of both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social
functions, for any non-negative (and possibly decreasing) latency functions and for the approxi-
mated version of the price of anarchy.
The fact that two different and seemingly uncorrelated approaches may produce the same type
of general results is quite interesting. Understanding whether there is some kind of relationships
between them is an intriguing question. Both approaches set up some machinery (smoothness
argument vs. primal-dual formulation) allowing for the proof of significant upper bounds on the
pure price of anarchy of the games under analysis and then make use of an extension theorem to
show that such bounds extend to the coarse correlated price of anarchy as well.
In particular, how is this last step achieved?
Note that the proof of the smoothness argument (see the proof of Lemma 5) requires the
definition of smoothness to hold only for any pair of strategy profiles (σ,σ′) such that σ is a pure
Nash equilibrium and σ′ is a social optimum. The reason why the definition of smoothness is
extended to encompass all possible pairs of strategy profiles is due to the fact that it is indeed the
proof of the extension theorem (see the proof of Theorem 2) that asks for such a stronger hypothesis.
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Finally, being a coarse correlated equilibrium a particular probability distribution defined over the
set of strategy profiles, the notion of smoothness characterizing each profile in the support of any
such an equilibrium can be suitably exploited by the linearity of expectation.
In the primal-dual method, instead, the higher degree of generality that is needed to move from
pure Nash equilibria up to coarse correlated equilibria is provided by the representative congestion
model which imposes that the variables yielding a feasible solution to the dual formulation for the
pure price of anarchy have to satisfy any type of “pure dual constraint” that may eventually arise
by considering all possible types of configurations of congestions. Then, since it turns out that
the dual constraint characterizing the dual formulation for the coarse correlated price of anarchy is
indeed a convex combination of a subset of all the possible “pure dual constraints”, the extension
theorem follows immediately.
Anyway, there is an major difference between the two methods when one aims at showing the
tightness of a particular class of games. When adopting the smoothness framework, after having
proved that a class of games is (λ, µ)-smooth for a certain pair of parameters λ and µ, one has to
show that there exists a game in the class for which the pure price of anarchy is indeed λ1−µ , that is,
that the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria matches the robust price of anarchy. We stress that
this step can be avoided when adopting the primal-dual formulation, since it is directly implied by
the Duality Theory (see Lemma 3). In fact, note that the notion of robust price of anarchy, as the
best possible upper bound on the pure price of anarchy achievable via the smoothness argument,
has no correspondent in the primal-dual method where this bound is implicitly defined by the
optimal solution of the pair of primal-dual programs.
By summarizing, our findings seem to reveal that the primal-dual method may be superior
to the smoothness framework within the realm of weighted congestion games and their possible
generalizations, but, at the same time, the primal-dual method has never been exploited so far
outside this realm. Hence, a good starting point would be that of trying to export it to other
scenarios of investigation in which the smoothness framework has already been fruitfully applied,
such as, for instance, the quantification of the price of anarchy in unrelated scheduling games, valid
utility games, opinion formation games and auction theory.
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Appendix
5 The Smoothness Argument and the Robust Price of Anarchy
Let G =
(
[n], (Σi)i∈[n], (ci)i∈[n]
)
be a cost minimization game defined by the set of players [n], the
set of strategies Σi and the individual cost function ci : Σ → R>0 for each player i ∈ [n]. A social
function SF : Σ→ R>0 for G is sum-bounded if, for each σ ∈ Σ, it holds that SF(σ) ≤
∑
i∈[n] ci(σ).
Definition 3 (Smoothness) Given a social function SF, G is (λ, µ)-smooth under SF if, for any
two strategy profiles σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, it holds that
∑
i∈[n] ci(σ−i, σ
′
i) ≤ λSF(σ
′) + µSF(σ).
The connection between the notion of smoothness and that of pure price of anarchy is captured
by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Smoothness Argument) If G is (λ, µ)-smooth under a sum-bounded social function
SF, with λ > 0 and µ < 1, then it holds that PPoA(SF,G) ≤ λ1−µ .
Proof: Let σ be any pure Nash equilibrium for G and o be a social optimum for G under SF. It
holds that
SF(σ) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
ci(σ) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
ci(σ−i, oi) ≤ λSF(o) + µSF(σ)
and the claim follows by rearranging the terms. 
The robust price of anarchy is then defined as the best possible upper bound on the pure price
of anarchy that can be proved via the smoothness argument. For a game G and a social function
SF, we denote with ASF(G) the set of parameters (λ, µ) such that G is (λ, µ)-smooth under SF.
Definition 4 (Robust Price of Anarchy) Given a sum-bounded social function SF, the robust
price of anarchy of G under SF, is the value ρSF(G) = inf
{
λ
1−µ : (λ, µ) ∈ ASF(G)
}
.
The power of the smoothness argument is then stressed by the following extension theorem.
Theorem 2 (Extension Theorem) For each cost minimization game G and sum-bounded social
function SF for G, it holds that CCPoA(SF,G) ≤ ρSF(G).
20
Proof: Let p be any coarse correlated equilibrium for G and o be a social optimum for G under
SF. It holds that∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · SF(σ) ≤
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]
ci(σ) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · ci(σ) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · ci(σ−i, oi)
=
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ
∑
i∈[n]
ci(σ−i, oi) ≤
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ (λSF(o) + µSF(σ)) = µ
∑
σ∈Σ
pσ · SF(σ) + λSF(o)
and the claim follows by rearranging the terms. 
Let C be a class of cost minimization games and Ĉ ⊆ C be the subclass of the games in C which
admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Given a social function SF, we denote with ASF(C) the
set of parameters (λ, µ) such that each game G ∈ Ĉ is (λ, µ)-smooth under SF.
Definition 5 (Tight Class of Games) A class of games C is tight under the social function SF
if it holds that sup
G∈Ĉ
PPoA(SF,G) = inf(λ,µ)∈A(C)
λ
1−µ .
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